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Abstract
Development of quality assured software-intensive systems, such as automo-
tive embedded systems, is an increasing challenge as the complexity of these sys-
tems significantly increases. EAST-ADL is an architecture description language
developed to specify automotive embedded system architectures at multiple ab-
straction levels in the development of safety-critical automotive products. In this
paper, we propose an architecture-based verification technique which enhances the
model-based development process supported by EAST-ADL by adapting model-
checking to EAST-ADL specifications. We employ UPPAAL as a verification tool
to ensure that predicted function behaviors of the models in EAST-ADL satisfy
functional and real-time requirements. The criteria for this architecture-based ver-
ification is presented and the transformation rules which comply with this criteria
are derived. This enables us to extract the relevant information from EAST-ADL
specifications and to generate analyzable UPPAAL models. The formal semantics
of EAST-ADL is defined which is essential to automate the verification of EAST-
ADL specifications. Our approach is demonstrated by verifying the safety of the
steering truck system units.
1 Introduction
EAST-ADL is an architecture description language for the development of automotive
embedded systems [1]. Advanced automotive functions [2, 3] are increasingly depen-
dent on software and electronics. These automotive embedded systems are becoming
progressively complex and critical for the entire vehicle. Among such factors which
effect the complexity are an increasing number of components and interactions be-
tween them as well as inter-disciplinary communication. Model-based development
(MBD) – i.e., the use of computerized models [4] supports activities or tools perform-
ing activities such as architecture specification, analysis, V&V, testing and synthesis
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– is a means to manage this complexity and develop embedded systems in a way that
increases safety and quality.
The EAST-ADL modeling approach addresses this issue and provides the means
to integrate engineering information from documents, spreadsheets and legacy tools
into one systematic structure, an EAST-ADL system model. Its methodology [5] is
an emerging MBD solution for automotive embedded systems development, provid-
ing support for architecture specification and constraints at multiple abstraction lev-
els. EAST-ADL expresses the structure and interconnection of the system. System
behavior is defined based on the definition of a set of elementary functional entities
and their triggers and interfaces. However, the behavioral semantics inside each ele-
mentary functional entity is not specified, which limits the automatic translation from
EAST-ADL models to other formal models for efficient verification. Instead, the exe-
cution of each function is described with external informal notations [6] and a legacy
tool such as Simulink [7], which is deficient in the analysis of timing requirements with
high-level assurance.
In order to alleviate the aforementioned restriction, we aim to bring in modeling
formalisms to the behavioral definitions of EAST-ADL that enhances the specifica-
tion and analysis support for system models in EAST-ADL, especially early V&V of
behavioral specifications, taking into account time- and behavioral constraints. We pro-
pose an architecture-based verification technique, which is based on formal constructs
enabling automation of the verification activities by adopting model checking to an
architectural perspective: We first introduce an EAST-ADL based verification criteria
which describes – 1. the objects of verification, i.e., constructs of EAST-ADL selected
for evaluation, and – 2. the conditions these objects have to meet. Furthermore, the
formal semantics of EAST-ADL is defined and it is critical to automate verification of
EAST-ADL specifications. Secondly, we present semantics mapping rules which com-
ply with this criteria in order to transform the selected constructs of EAST-ADL into
UPPAAL Timed Automata (TA) models [8, 9]. Finally, we demonstrate the applicabil-
ity of model checking in automotive applications.
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces technology and back-
ground, EAST-ADL and UPPAAL toolkit as used in our approach. Section 3 presents
our approach and methodology to improve formal analysis and verification capabil-
ity of EAST-ADL. In section 4, our method is demonstrated in verifying the safety of
the steering system units design. In section 5, related work is discussed. Section 6
concludes the paper and plans future work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 EAST-ADL
EAST-ADL (Electronics, Architecture and Software Technology – Architecture De-
scription Language) is an ADL dedicated to automotive electronic systems resulting
from several European projects [10, 1]. The language provides support for architec-
tural specifications at different abstraction levels.
The highest abstraction level, Vehicle(Feature) level, characterizes a vehicle by
means of its features and requirements. At Analysis level, functionality is realized
based on the features and requirements. These features and requirements are refined
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by the decision of logical design with the definition of logical abstract functions of fea-
tures and their interactions, and requirements. The model at this level is used for the
analysis of control requirements, timing constraints, data consistency between inter-
faces, hazard identification, etc. Design level contains concrete functional definitions
according to the realized logical design. In particular, functional definitions of appli-
cation software, functional abstraction of hardware and middleware are presented, as
well as hardware architecture being captured and function-to-hardware allocation be-
ing defined. At Implementation level, the component architecture is represented using
the AUTOSAR standard [11] or similar specifications.
EAST-ADL has extensions for environment modeling, requirements specification,
timing, dependability and V & V at every abstraction level. This modular approach
separates the definition of functional and non-functional aspects such as behavior and
related constraints for such behaviors as timing, and safety. The behavior annex [6]
contains extensions to EAST-ADL for a more fine-grained specification of key behavior
attributes and is aligned with the language but not yet validated, nor included in the base
specification.
In this paper we refer to this behavioral annex (BA) to construct an analyzable
UPPAAL TA model. The contents of BA such as timing- and behavior constraints,
are utilized to constrain behavioral definitions in the UPPAAL TA model. Moreover,
those constraints as well as textual requirements are formalized in linear time logics
and are used as UPPAAL queries, which can be verified over the generated TA model
by UPPAAL model checker. Details will be explained in Section 3.
2.2 UPPAAL
UPPAAL [8] is a model checking tool for modeling, validation and verification of real-
time systems. UPPAAL is used to model a system as a network of Timed Automata
(TA)[9] – this tool allows construction of large models by composing TA in parallel
and permits communications between TAs using share discrete and clock variables and
synchronize (rendezvous-style) on complementary input and output actions, as well as
broadcast actions – and to verify requirements of the model by the UPPAAL query
language expressed in a subset of Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [12]. The property
specification language supports safety, liveness, deadlock, and response properties that
can be solved by reachability analysis.
UPPAAL is comprised of three main parts: an editor, a simulator, and a verifier
for modeling, early fault detection (by examination without exhaustive checking) and
verification (covering exhaustive dynamic behavior) respectively in a graphical envi-
ronment. UPPAAL uses the concept of templates for reusability and prototyping of
system components. Each template can be instantiated multiple times to represent sim-
ilar TA with varying parameters.
Additional features offered by UPPAAL in comparison to other model-checking
tools are bounded integer variables, committed and urgent conditions. Committed lo-
cations must be left immediately by the next transition taken in the system. Urgent
locations must be left without letting time pass, but allows interleaving by other au-
tomata. For details of UPPAAL TA, we refer the reader to [8].
Another feature of UPPAAL is the use of a subset of C-code for its declarations.
This is beneficial in the sense that C is one of the most commonly used languages for
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Figure 1: Methodology Roadmap
real-time systems. Furthermore, it is possible to use C syntax for EAST-ADL expres-
sions. L.Feng et al. [13] transformed C syntax in EAST-ADL to PROMELA to enable
model checking in SPIN. This is not required in the case of UPPAAL if the same subset
of C is used for both EAST-ADL and UPPAAL.
3 Approach and Methodology
To achieve our aforementioned goal in section 1, we propose a formal approach which
facilitates the verification of system behaviors in EAST-ADL by using UPPAAL model-
checker independently of any hardware constraints and topology mapping. It focuses
mainly on the higher level of functional behavior of applications at Analysis level in
terms of its Feature level with three distinct phases – verification criteria, M2M trans-
formation, and verification (model checking). We will discuss those phases in more
detail in following sections.
3.1 Verification Criteria
An EAST-ADL-based verification criteria is introduced and applied to the step from
Modeling Framework to Analysis Framework in our methodology roadmap Fig.1. In-
deed, the formal semantics of EAST-ADL is defined and it is essential to facilitate the
automation of V&V technique.
The verification criteria describes the objects of verification, i.e., constructs of
EAST-ADL specifications selected for evaluation, and the conditions these objects have
to meet. The possible objects are restricted to four different types of constructs: Func-
tions, Ports and Connectors, Artifacts, and Behavioral Annex.
Functions: EAST-ADL refers to components as features, functions or components, de-
pending on which conceptual abstraction level is considered. As we focus on Analysis
level, AnalysisFunctions (AF) are selected as abstraction of computational units, i.e.
SteeringColumnCalculator, TorqueSensor, etc. They are illustrated as function entities
in Fig.2. Each AF has its own logical execution, which is specified in UPPAAL TA and
used for verification in this paper.
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<<analysisFunctionType>> 
FunctionalAnalysisArchitecture 
 <<analysisFunctionPrototype>> 
+Swheel: SteeringWheel [1] 
 
 
 
 
+ turn: Torque [1] 
  <<analysisFunctionPrototype>> 
+ Tsensor: TorqueSensor [1] 
 
 
+ torque: Torque [1] 
  <<analysisFunctionPrototype>> 
+ SCC: SteeringColumnCalculator [1] 
 
        
 + cpout: ColumnPosition [1] 
+ turn: Torque [1] 
+ torque: Torque [1] 
  <<analysisFunctionPrototype>> 
+ Pinion: Pinion [1] 
 
        
  
+ cpout: ColumnPosition [1] 
+ rforce: RackForce [1] 
+ rpout: RackPosition [1] 
  <<analysisFunctionPrototype>> 
+ Rack: Rack [1] 
 
        
 
  <<analysisFunctionPrototype>> 
+ Motor: Actuator [1] 
 
  + voltage: Voltage [1]      
  
+ rpout:  RackPosition [1] 
+ rforce: RackForce [1] 
+ voltage: Voltage [1] 
<<FunctionConnector>> 
<<FunctionConnector>> 
<<FunctionConnector>> 
Figure 2: Steering Truck System modeled in EAST-ADL
Ports and connectors: There are two types of function interaction either a Function-
FlowPort interaction whereby a function performs a computation on provided data, or
a ClientServerPort interaction whereby the execution of a service is called upon by an-
other function. The FunctionFlowPort are directional interaction points for exchange
of data between AFs and specified by associated data-types, and they are connected to
other ports via connectors. Both interactions are validated by checking if the execu-
tion of TA and its synchronization with other TAs are not blocked. Since EAST-ADL
connectors are dependent on the ports of AFs they connect, the modeling and verify-
ing connectors should describe which AF ports are connected together, and ensure that
data- and control flows interactions between AFs through the ports are correct respec-
tively.
Artifacts: Each AF consists of three different kinds of artifacts: structure, behavior
and timing packages. They are shown as red, blue, and green respectively in Fig.3
where the FunctionTrigger defines TriggerPolicy as either time or event-behavior to
specify timing constraints. According to the TriggerPolicy, the AF is invoked either by
time-triggered in which time alone causes execution to start, or event-triggered, which
is caused by data arrival or calls on the input ports. For each AF, its artifacts are used
to construct corresponding TA and declare how the execution of TA is dispatched.
Behavioral Annex (BA): BA contains behavioral constraints which are given in three
categories: Parameter Constraints, State Machine Constraints, and Computation Con-
straints (See Fig.4 with dependencies). Based on aforementioned artifacts, we further
detail each computation and execution behavior of TA by capturing related Parameter-,
State Machine-, and Computation Constraints from BA.
In reference to Parameter Constraints, we specify – 1. quantities of constraints
to be processed by the computation and execution behavior of TA model, and – 2.
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Figure 3: Steering Column Calculator artifacts
conditions under which each of these quantities is used. The conditions of Parameter
Constraints such as pre-, post, and invariant conditions in the computational modes
in EAST-ADL as well as the relations of parameters (e.g., input and output mapping,
event to output mapping) are used as (i.e. translated into) the corresponding condi-
tions in TA model. The locations and transitions of TA model are constructed taking
into account State Machine Constraints. The logical transformation of data in a Func-
tionalBehavior is represented in TA by referring to Computation Constraints or the
conditions of Parameter Constraints
According to the objects of verification above, the execution of FunctionalBehavior
within an EAST-ADL system can be considered a combination of multiple end-to-end
computation and execution chains across its AFs under the triggering definitions, and
the behavioral- and timing constraints given in artifacts and BA respectively. Thus,
evaluating the FunctionalBehavior in EAST-ADL is to ensure the two following con-
ditions:
1. For each AF, its corresponding TA execution such as flow- or data interaction via
synchronization with its environments (other TAs) is not blocked, i.e., Deadlock-
free condition.
2. When the interaction or synchronization is carried out, data transformation is
performed as an expected computation activity on two sets of parameters. The
conditions of those parameters such as pre-, post-, and invariant conditions must
hold before the transformation starts its execution, after the execution of the
transformation, and must remain unchanged by the execution of the transforma-
tion respectively.
To perform a behavioral semantics mapping from the informal semantics of EAST-
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Figure 4: Schematic View of Behavioral Constraints Annex
ADL architectural model to the formal semantics of UPPAAL TA model, we formally
define behavioral semantics of EAST-ADL below. This step is critical to automate the
verification technique using UPPAAL model checker. UPPAAL tool composes each
local TA of AF in parallel to a composed TA (network TA).
Essentially, EAST-ADL model is a tuple 〈N,CE〉, where N is a set of ADLFunc-
tionalPrototypes AFs, and CE ⊆ N×N is the set of connectors between AFs. Output
variables of one AF may be connected to input variables of another AF. The behavior
B inside an AF, noted ~BAF , is modeled as an UPPAAL TA = 〈L, l0,VC,VD,E, I〉,
where L is a set of locations, l0 ∈ L is the initial location, VC and VD is a set of clock
and data variables respectively. I assigns an invariant to each of the locations. E is
a set of edges, represented as l
g,a,u−→ l′, where l is a source location, l′ is a destination
location, g is a guard, a is an action, u is an update.
The execution of each AF behavior is determined in terms of triggering values
(conditions) given in BA or artifacts. When the triggering condition is active, the
AF is triggered via its input trigger port, and its input data ports are mapped to data
variables. VD in TA are updated with those variables by read-input-from-ports action,
noted READ(Pin), (respectively write-output-to-ports, noted WRITE(Pout )), which are
atomic and urgent (in the sense that time is not allowed to pass when AF reads or
writes). AF is initially idle after the read action it switches to its executing locations
until its internal computation is done. After the write action, which forwards data in
variables via connections from the output ports, the AF becomes idle again and the
trigger condition is updated to inactive. The behavior of AF is formally defined as
follows:
Definition 1 The behavior of AnalysisFunction AF is a tupleB= 〈L, l0, l f ,VD∪P,VC,E∪
{er,ew}〉 where
• l0 is the initial location (also considered the idle location).
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• l f is the final executable location such that the edges in E leading out from l f
lead to the l0.
• P is the set of ports of the component described as Pin∪Pout ∪Ptrig, where Pin is
a set of input ports, Pout is a set of output ports, Ptrig ⊆ Pin is the set of trigger
input ports.
• er = l0 g,r,u−→ l′, if g is triggered, r is the ”read-input-from-ports” action, READ(Pin),
and u updates VD with input values (Pin\Ptrig).
• ew = l f g,w,u−→ l0, if g is true, w is the ”write-outputs-on-ports” action, WRITE(Pout ),
and u resets Ptrig to ”inactive”.
The TA of a composition C, TA(C), is defined as a network of local TA. For AFi and
its corresponding component Ci ∈C, the write action in TA(Ci) is extended to update
the input ports (noted Pin. j) of a target component C j ∈C according to interconnections
from the out ports of Ci (noted Pout.i). An interconnection connects a source port p ∈
Pout.i to a target port p′ ∈ Pin. j whenever variables in Pin of C are enabled in a way that
if p′ is a trigger port then p′ is activated, otherwise p′ = p. The edges e of TA(Ci) are
explained with extended write actions as follows.
Definition 2 The behavior B inside AFi, ~BAFi , is TA(Ci) = 〈 L, l0, l f , VD, VC,
{XWRIT Ei(e) | e ∈ E}, I〉 such that
• XWRIT Ei (l g,a,u−→ l′) , (l g,w,u−→ l′ ; WRIT E(Pout.i)), if a = w and g is triggered
(holds).
Note that ; is defined as sequential execution
• XWRIT Ei (l g,a,u−→ l′) , l g,a,u−→ l′ , for a , w
The automata TA(C) is then the network of each TA(Ci) for Ci ∈C.
An environment is modeled as TAEnv in a similar way. The resulting composition is
thus defined as the network TA(C)×TAEnv, where any edge in TAEnv updating ports
Pin of C, is extended with an update WRIT E(Pout.Env). This is similar to the adaption
of the XWRIT E action that is used to build TA(Ci) in Definition 2.
3.2 M2M Transformation
This model-to-model transformation step, called M2M, is to transform EAST-ADL
specifications to UPPAAL models under the verification criteria. This step is illustrated
as a M2M direction in Analysis Framework in Fig.1. Automated formal verification is
not feasible directly on EAST-ADL specification since EAST-ADL lacks formal and
implemented semantics. In order to perform automated formal verification, we first
formally mapped the execution semantics of EAST-ADL to UPPAAL TAs (Ref. Def 1
and 2 in Section 3.1).
In this section, we present transformation rules which helps to extract executable
UPPAAL TAs from EAST-ADL specifications. The derived UPPAAL models comply
with artifact packages, BA and functional requirements of EAST-ADL model under
the verification criteria. A few assumptions are made in order to simplify the transfor-
mation procedure:
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• We focus on FunctionalAnalysisArchitecture (FAA) at the analysis level of EAST-
ADL where each AF is associated with AnalysisPorts. Except for FAA, no func-
tion type is allowed to have instances for other function types.
• Unlike the original EAST-ADL specification, ports’ events are related not only
to triggering but also to synchronization. This implies that sending and receiving
data from a port is also considered an event although it is not used to trigger a
particular function. This assumption is required for the verification of end-to-end
timing property using reaction time constraints.
• The communication channels between different processes in UPPAAL is of broad-
cast type. This complies with EAST-ADL specifications where each elementary
AF follows run-to-completion execution with non-blocking semantics and ports
are over-writable buffers.
In terms of these assumptions, we first present a general transformation scheme which
can be described as follows.
M2M General Transformation Scheme: For each EAST-ADL system (FAA), an
UPPAAL system consisting of a set of processes is created. For each elementary AF,
an UPPAAL process is defined whereby a local clock is declared. This local clock is
used to specify the execution time of AF.
Each connector between AF ports is transformed to an UPPAAL broadcast channel.
Global and local variables of processes are defined regarding Parameter Constraints in
BA. The value-passing action between two AFs is performed using global variables
via broadcasting channels between the corresponding UPPAAL processes. Control- or
data flow behaviors of AFs follow the computation activities on two sets of quantities in
terms of the Computation- and StateMachine constraint, i.e., pre-, port-, and invariant
parameter conditions in BA.
Secondly, and more importantly, we present three transformation rules, Time-Triggering
rule, Event-Triggering rule, and End-to-End reaction time rule. Each proposed trans-
formation rule is specified in UPPAAL TA and a schematic graphical-structure view of
the corresponding EAST-ADL is illustrated below.
Time-Triggering rule: This rule transforms the periodic behaviors of AF. From the
given artifacts and BA of EAST-ADL model, if related FunctionTriggerPolicy is TIME
and its TriggerPeriod defines the periodic triggering time (Period := n) , i.e., this AF
is invoked every n time, then the EAST-ADL model which is illustrated as the upper
view in Fig.5 is transformed to the corresponding TA which is depicted as the lower
view in Fig.6.
An event-triggered function may be invoked during the time-triggering period due
to data arrival or call from or to other AFs. If this happens, then an invariant clk≤m (m
is ExecutionTime of the event) is added to Run location. An invariant clk≤ Period−m
in Finish location specifies the expiry of the fixed-periodic triggering time after the
ExecutionTime of event-triggered functions. For each transition, the local clock is
reset. For each port associated with its connector, a related broadcast channel is defined
as the port name TimeTriggerIn? and TimeTriggerOut! representing time-triggering
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input- and output ports or EventTriggerIn? and DesiredEventTrigger! representing
event-triggering input- and output ports respectively.
A global integer variable ConnectT and a local integer variable ReceiveTrigg are
declared. ConnectT is assigned the value of 1 initially. When a time-triggering signal
is received through TimeTriggerIn?, the local variable ReceiveTrigg is assigned the
value of ConnectT . When the signal is sent out through TimeTriggerOut!, the global
variable ConnectT is assigned the value of ReceiveTrigg, and then the local variable
ReceiveTrigg is reset to 0.
Similarly, the value of ReceiveEventData is passed from the current TA in Fig.5 to
the variable ReceiveData of TA in Fig.6 using the global variable ConnectE through the
broadcast channel DesiredEventTrigger. Location Run in Fig.5 is committed to ensure
that no other TAs can assign their local variables with the value of ReceiveEventData
before the TA in Fig.6 sets ReceiveData := ConnectE. Once the periodic triggering
time is expired, i.e., clk ≥ Period−m, then Time TriggerOut! is broadcast. There-
fore, this rule can facilitate the synchronization of various clocks in a design and avoid
unpredictable delays.
Period := n, where n ϵ  N 
Clock variable :=  clk 
ExecutionTime  of event := m 
 
<<AF>> 
TimeTriggerIn 
EventTriggerIn 
TimeTriggerOut 
DesiredEventTrigger 
DesiredEventTrigger! 
Figure 5: Time-triggered rule
Event-Triggering rule: From the given artifacts and BA of EAST-ADL model, for
any AF if related FunctionTriggerPolicy is EVENT and its TriggerPeriod defines the
execution time of the invoked event (ExecutionTime := etime), then the EAST-ADL
model which is illustrated as the upper view in Fig.6 is transformed to the correspond-
ing TA, which is depicted as the lower view. The defined execution time (etime) is
added as an invariant to Run location to specify the expiry of the ExecutionTime of
event-triggering function. For each transition, the local clock is reset. For each port,
a relevant broadcast channel is defined as the port name DdesiredEventTrigger? and
EventTriggerOut! representing event-triggering input- and output ports respectively.
Value passing from current TA to the others is represented similar to the aforemen-
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tioned one in the Time-triggering rule above.
The executable event flows from Run location to Init location can be refined into
corresponding behavioral automaton where Run and Init locations being the initial lo-
cation and the final location respectively. The refinement is made straightforward by
adding more Running locations, transitions, and associated variables as well as broad-
casting channels between Run and Init locations. They represent more interactions
between the current AF and other AFs. The timing properties of the basic and refined
model should be identical, because the newly introduced locations represent the former
original location, and the union of the new locations clock invariants (union of individ-
ual execution time) should fulfill the former invariant execution time (clk ≤ etime).
  Clock variable := clk 
  ExecutionTime := etime  
   
<<AF>> DesiredEventTrigger EventTriggerOut 
DesiredEventTrigger? 
Figure 6: Event-triggered rule
End-To-End reaction time rule: This rule transforms the End-To-End reaction time
behavior between two AFs into TAs. The reaction time constraint which is given in
BA is first represented as the bounded response time property formula of the form
AG( f 1⇒≤T f 2), meaning that if a request (f1) becomes true at a certain time point, a
response (f2) must be guaranteed to be true within a time bound (T).
In order to verify this time constraint property, we take a similar approach from
our early experiment in [14], which shows how to check bounded liveness properties
with a certain syntactical manipulation on the system model. An observer TA (see
righthand view in Fig.7), which restricts the bounded response time (MAX T IME) is
constructed. This observer TA contains a clock constraint (obstime ≤ MAX T IME)
and an error location, which violates the bounded response time condition.
One synchronization channel event1? is added to the transition from Init to Run in
order to deal with a request event of AF1. Another synchronization channel event2?
is added to the transition from Run to Init in order to handle a response event of AF2.
Afterwards, the observer is syntactically composed with the actual AFs (TAs), say AF1
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(TA1) and AF2 (TA2), then we checked if its error location can never be reached from
any location of AF1 (TA1) and AF2 (TA2).
Figure 7: End-To-End reaction time rule
3.3 Verification: Model Checking
The execution of each FunctionBehavior in EAST-ADL is transformed to UPPAAL TA
which holds the verification criteria and its composition is considered as the network
TA. The formal semantics of EAST-ADL has been investigated, where UPPAAL TA
is used. The entire system (network TA) is considered in terms of a timed transition
system, then this entire system is verified by UPPAAL model-checker. Quality require-
ments (e.g, timing, safety, deadlock freedom) in terms of functional requirements (e.g,
behavioral constraints, timing constraints), see Fig.1-Requirement aspect, are formal-
ized in linear time logics based on the UPPAAL logic, which can be verified over the
transformed TA model by UPPAAL model checker. This step is shown as Verification
Framework in Fig.1.
In particular, the quality requirements are derived from a given system’s textual
descriptions. One may verify certain delay, reaction and synchronization constraints
(i.e, overall behavioral constraints of a system) according to the quality requirements.
For example, a plausible reaction constraint is 250 ms. In contrast, functional require-
ments describe particular constraints of a function such as timing constraints and trig-
ger elements linked to an AF entity, i.e., triggering policy and parameter constraints in
artifacts and BA.
UPPAAL model checker verifies those two types of requirements as safety proper-
ties in a way that (1). if a property is satisfied by the target model, then a functional
requirement linked to an AF is updated to a satisfy relation and generic constraints of
the AF are stored as valid invariants in the V&V structure (VVOutcome linked to the
explained requirement, VVCase, etc) of the EAST-ADL model. (2). If a property is vi-
olated (depicted as Not Satisfied arrows in Fig.1) then UPPAAL model checker returns
some counterexamples that can help analysts to refine the behavioral constraints of the
system model or modify generic constraints in BA, and identify correct constraints for
the AF that it concerns. Thus, the models in EAST-ADL are updated with the timing
assumptions analysts make as well as the analysis results.
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4 Experiment
Our approach applied and demonstrated on a case study, the Steering System Units
(SSU), from our industrial partner VOLVO. It is first modeled using Papyrus UML [15]
for EAST-ADL in the ATESST2 project [1]. The SSU Papyrus UML model consists of
six AFs and the interfaces of the AFs are expressed in terms of ports and connections as
depicted in Fig.2. Each of these AFs can be further decomposed into smaller or more
detail DesignFunctions or Components depending on the level of abstraction in EAST-
ADL. The functionalities (AFs) of SSU used within the current work are as follows:
• Steering Wheel is manipulated by the driver and reads such driver input;
• Torque Sensor senses the steering wheel position and sends a desired torque to
the steering column calculator;
• Steering Column Calculator calculates the torque and positions required for
the pinion and sends the calculated values to the pinion;
• Pinion senses a rotational motion in terms of the calculated values from the
steering column calculator and sends a desired torque force as well as a desired
rack command to the rack;
• Rack converts a rotational motion into a linear motion based on the received
values and commands from the pinion;
• Actuator performs the actual steering of each wheel.
The SSU Papyrus UML model at Analysis level in EAST-ADL is transformed to an
UPPAAL model under the verification criteria: For AFs, FunctionBehaviors are se-
mantically translated into a network of TAs in terms of their corresponding artifacts
and BA. The functional and quality requirements of the system were given as either
informal description in ATESST2 project case study reports or as timing- or behav-
ioral constraints requirement entities linked to AFs from BA. Due to space limitation,
here we present only the UPPAAL TAs of Steering Wheel, Torque Sensor and Steering
Column Calculator shown in Fig.8, Fig.9 and Fig.10 respectively.
The requirements formalized in UPPAAL logics over the network of TAs are veri-
fied by model-checking with some assumptions regarding timing: there is a data flow
from a steering wheel to a motor actuator. The functions are periodic and mutually
unsynchronized. A perfect clock is assumed in the sense that it generates periodic
triggering in order to activate (run) the AFs with a periodicity of one time unit. Each
function has its execution time which is modeled with an execution delay location in its
TA. Based on those assumptions, properties of safety, deadlock freedom and liveness
are verified successfully.
We verified 25 properties of the system. The evaluation conditions mentioned in
Section 3 is referenced to formalize the properties. A list of selected properties is given
below and their verification results are established as valid:
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Figure 8: Steering Wheel UPPAAL TA
Figure 9: Torque Sensor UPPAAL TA
Figure 10: Steering Column Control UPPAAL TA
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\∗ De f inition o f each AnalysisFunction
C1 = Steering Wheel
C2 = Torque Sensor
C3 = Steering Column calculator(SCC)
C4 = Pinion
C5 = Rack
C6 = Actuator ∗\
• Deadlock freedom: A[ ] 1 not deadlock
• Leads-to property based on the internal variables of AFs: Every time Steering
Column Calculator (SCC) is invoked by Steering Wheel or Torque Sensor, it
will eventually calculate column positions for Pinion according to the steering
position and torque force.
C3.Idle −→ (C3.RCal ∨C3.LCal ∨C3.NCal ∨C3.MCal)
• Leads-to property based on the interactive values via ports: If Steering Wheel
sends out its position value then the value should be received by SCC.
(C1.RTurn ∧C1.wp == 1) −→ (C3.RCal ∧C3.cp == 1)
• State correspondence check: One internal location of an AF corresponds to what
is happening in the locations of other environment AFs. While Steering Wheel
is turning right, neither the left-column-calculating mode of SCC nor the left-
rotation mode of Pinion is executing.
A[ ]C1.RTurn⇒ (¬C3.LCal ∧ ¬C4.LRot)
• Execution time property: Each AF should execute within its given local execu-
tion time, 0≤ clk ≤ 2.
A[ ]C6.Run⇒ (0 ≤C6.clk ≤ 2)
• Bounded liveness property: When Steering Wheel is activated, Actuator reacts
timely under its given time bound (MAX TIME) as a failsafe against serious
accident.
A[ ]C1.RTurn⇒ (¬ ObsTA.error ∧C6.Run)
In other words, if Steering Wheel is invoked, it should not reach the error location
of the observer TA, which violates the MAX TIME bounded condition, while
Actuator is executing.
1A[ ] P: ”P holds for any reachable configuration” is written A[ ] in UPPAAL format
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Search order is breadth first and uses conservative space optimization. The state space
representation uses difference bound matrices (DBM). Verifying properties takes an
average of around 2 seconds per verified property on an Intel T9600 2.80 GHz pro-
cessor. The UPPAAL model checker needs to explore a maximum of 38166 states.
The maximum is reached when verifying properties where the model checker needs to
explore the whole sate space (such as the non-existence of a deadlock situation).
5 Related Work
For safety-driven system development in the automotive domain, feature- and archi-
tecture based analysis is prescribed by ISO standard as the state-of-the-art approach to
functional safety. However, at an early stage it is difficult to see function dependen-
cies that would result in updated function requirements. Therefore, A. Sandberg et al.
[16] provide one approach that performs iterative analysis to manage changes in the
safety architecture at analysis level and still meet function specific safety goals derived
at vehicle level. In comparison to our work, their main concern is to define the se-
mantics for requirement selection in order to ensure correct inclusion of requirements
for a function definition. There is no formal modeling and verification approach to the
behavioral definition of EAST-ADL.
L. Feng et al. [13] propose a reference behavior modeling approach which employs
UML activity diagram, C code and SPIN to study the execution logic of the components
and their communication protocol in EAST-ADL. Thus the requirements on the system
design can be verified by model checking. In contrast to our work, there is no notion for
the timing constraints in the behavior model. Indeed, formal analysis on the real-time
properties of the behavior model is not considered at all.
The TIMMO project [10] introduces TADL (Timing Augmented Description Lan-
guage). The language and its methodology [17] is aligned with EAST-ADL and AU-
TOSAR [11] for timing analysis aspects. In contrast to the TIMMO effort focused
on its timing extension, our work focuses on the behavioral aspects complying with
the timing extension. Therefore, our work contributes towards the development of the
EAST-ADL behavioral extension.
Our earlier work [14] verifies EAST-ADL models using UPPAAL-PORT1. The
work uses mainly structural information of EAST-ADL and its requirement, where
models are manually translated into SAVE-CCM [18], which is the required input for-
mat for UPPAAL-PORT. In contrast to that work [14], we consider recent additions to
EAST-ADL, including both the timing and behavior extensions by analyzing applica-
tion internal behaviors specified in behavioral annex as well as using artifact packages.
Furthermore, we eliminate the need for intermediate formalisms like SAVE-CCM and
target direct transformation of EAST-ADL specifications to UPPAAL TAs.
Another widely used ADL within both industry and the research community for ar-
chitectural modeling and analysis of time-critical software intensive embedded systems
is Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) [19]. S. Bjo¨rnander et al. [20]
propose an approach to formal and implemented semantics of AADL, where the Timed
Abstract State Machine (TASM) [21] language is used as the formal underpinning. We
take a similar approach by transforming EAST-ADL constructs to Timed Automata,
1http://www.uppaal.org/port
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especially UPPAAL TA, in order to allow tool-supported automated simulation and
verification of EAST-ADL specification by using UPPAAL model checker. The result
of our work contribute towards the development of EAST-ADL behavior extension [6]
and further refinement of the existing behavior extension.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have studied the use of formal modeling and verification techniques
at an early stage in the development of safety-critical automotive products which are
originally described in the EAST-ADL architectural language. We have proposed an
architecture-based verification technique which brings formal modeling formalisms to
the behavioral definitions of EAST-ADL to capture the execution flows inside each
functional entity and their complex interactions and verify them by using the UPPAAL
model checker.
This architecture-based modeling, analysis and verification methodology is suitable
for a higher abstraction level, the current work focuses on the EAST-ADL analysis
level, but can be extended to the design level. This will require only a change the type
of functions and prototypes in the modeling process.
This paper has furthermore presented the criteria of EAST-ADL based verification
technique. This criteria describes – 1. the selected constructs of EAST-ADL such as
artifacts, structural Papyrus models, and BA as well as requirements which are utilized
for the purpose of generating UPPAAL TA models or UPPAAL queries, and – 2. the
conditions these objects have to meet.
Moreover, the formal syntax and semantics of EAST-ADL are defined, and this
is essential for automated verification of EAST-ADL specifications, i.e., the formal
definition enables the EAST-ADL model to be automatically transformed to models of
other established tools for V&V support. Indeed semantics mapping rules are presented
between EAST-ADL specifications and UPPAAL TAs under the verification criteria.
These rules enable us to generate analyzable UPPAAL models from the EAST-ADL
specifications.
These contributions improve behavior modeling, verification and analysis capa-
bility of EAST-ADL. To demonstrate the applicability of our approach, the steering
system units case study has been translated from the EAST-ADL Papyrus model into
the UPPAAL model. By employing the UPPAAL model checker, the verification of
expected safety and liveness properties for this system are fully automated.
In future works, we plan to – 1. include more elaborate verification of non-functional
properties, and more refined configurations of the generated model. For example, min-
imizing the use of certain resources, such as CPU, energy, memory, etc, while preserv-
ing functional correctness, timing requirements and other resource constraints. The
results presented here are promising steps towards these goals, – 2. investigate schedu-
lability analysis of timed-component models (source models from EAST-ADL) using
UPPAAL in order to guarantee that the applied scheduling principle ensures that the
timing deadlines are met. The planned enhancement includes consideration of func-
tional design prototypes of EAST-ADL models in Papyrus UML at the design level as
the source instead of using functional analysis prototypes at the analysis level as pre-
sented in this paper, and – 3. extend this work to verify the refinement process over
different abstraction levels, i.e., to check if the basic features captured at the vehicle
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level are correctly refined (realized) in related functions at the analysis level as well as
at the design level where the functionalities depicted at the analysis level are further
decomposed or restructured.
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